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Abstract
We propose a new model of simultaneous price competition, where rms
o¤er personalized prices to consumers, who then independently decide which
o¤er to accept, if any. Even with decreasing returns to scale, this decentral-
ized market mechanism has a unique equilibrium, which is independent of
any exogenously imposed rule for rationing or demand sharing. In equilib-
rium, the rms behave as if they were price takers, leading to the competitive
outcome (but positive prots). Given the unique result for the short-run
competition, we are able to investigate the rmsex ante capital investment
decisions. While there is underinvestment in the long-run equilibrium, the
overall outcome is more competitive than one-shot Cournot competition.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we take a fresh look at markets where the rms compete in prices
to attract consumers. This is a fundamental topic of industrial organization that
has been thoroughly investigated, ever since the original contribution of Cournot
(1838).1 Our excuse for re-opening the case is that we o¤er a new way of modelling
price competition, which naturally leads to a unique equilibrium with price equal
to marginal cost, even when the latter is increasing. The innovation we propose is
to allow the rms to personalize their prices. The resulting conceptual advantage
is not the feasibility of rst-degree price discrimination which does not occur in
equilibrium , rather, the exibility allowed by personalized pricing ensures that
competition is cut-throat even when attracting too much demand is harmful (be-
cause of increasing marginal costs). The enhanced level of competition leads to a
unique (symmetric) equilibrium with all consumers being o¤ered the competitive
price. Notably, we need not make arbitrary assumptions about either a rationing
rule: each rm serves the very consumers who accept its o¤er; or a demand shar-
ing rule: when a consumer receives two equal o¤ers she randomizes according to
her (endogenously derived) equilibrium strategy. Armed with a solution to price
competition, we revisit the question of how competitive the outcome of two-stage
competition rst technology choice, then (personalized) price competition is rel-
ative to a one-shot Cournot model. We show that despite the competitive result of
the rst stage, in the two-stage game there are still distortions: there is underin-
vestment in the long-run factor. Nonetheless except if the technology is Leontie¤
the overall outcome is more competitive than the Cournot outcome.
1.1 Deconstructing the Bertrand Paradox
Take the standard model of simultaneous price competition between two producers
of a homogeneous good at constant and identical marginal cost, commonly referred
1While Cournot (1838) only discussed quantity competition for the more salient case of substi-
tute goods, he did formalize price competition as well, for the case of perfect complements.
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to as the Bertrand duopoly. This model has a unique equilibrium, where both rms
price at marginal/average cost, thereby earning zero prot. While the model itself
seems realistic, the result is clearly not: even though there are only two competitors,
they have no market power at all. The literature has dealt with this issue by
enriching the model, incorporating product di¤erentiation, price-quantity bidding,
privately known cost functions or dynamic competition. While these generalized
models are useful in their own right, it is nonetheless conceptually relevant to note
that actually nothing is amiss in the basic model.
Recall that, assuming that rms are price-takers in the input markets, when
average costs are decreasing in output we have a natural monopoly: there is room
for only one rm in the market. The paradoxicalsituation with constant marginal
cost is the limiting case of this, where two rms can justt. When average costs
are increasing, marginal costs are above average cost and as we will discuss below
in detail rms do make positive prots in the Bertrand duopoly, despite still pricing
at marginal cost.
The seemingly innocuous simplifying assumption of constant marginal costs
actually leads to a non-generic, knife-edge situation, just between the cases where a
duopoly can make prots or losses. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that
constant marginal costs lead to zero prots in oligopoly: there is no paradox.
Let us re-examine the Bertrand duopoly when marginal costs are increasing. As
shown by Dastidar (1995), this scenario is not the panacea either, as it leads to
multiple equilibria. There exists a range of prices, such that if a rm charges one of
them the other rms best response is to charge the same price.2 Denoting demand
byD(:) and cost by C(:), the lowest equilibrium price, p, is where the sellers splitting
the demand3 just break even: pD(p) = 2C(D(p)=2).4 The highest one, p, is where
serving the entire demand gives the same prot as splitting it: pD(p)  C(D(p)) =
2The indeterminacy of this result is rather severe. For instance, if demand is Q = 1 p and cost
is quantity squared, the lowest and highest equlibrium prices are p = 13 and p =
3
5 : The monopoly
price would be 34 , the Cournot price
3
5 (it is just a coincidence that it equals p).
3Dastidar assumes equal sharing of the demand for rms charging the same price.
4Ignoring the choke-price root.
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pD(p)=2 C(D(p)=2). The reason for this plethora of equilibria is the obligation of
a deviant rm to serve all comers at the announced price. With constant marginal
costs this is not an issue. However, when average costs are increasing, satisfying the
entire market demand what happens if a rm undercuts its competitor may not
be an advantageous proposition. With deviations discouraged, equilibria thrive.
In order to regain a unique equilibrium price, we could make use of Dixons
(1992)5 modied Bertrand-Edgeworth game, where in addition to their price the
rms also announce the maximum quantity they are willing to sell at it. Together
with a demand sharing rule6 and a freely chosen7 rationing rule, this resolves Dasti-
dars problem that downward deviations are too costly, and by having rms commit
to supply  if needed more than their share in the competitive equilibrium, it
removes the incentive for rivals to increase their price above the competitive one
(residual demand is zero), thus destroying the Edgeworth Cycle.
In this paper, we propose an alternative model of price competition also sup-
porting the competitive outcome as the unique equilibrium outcome where the
rms make a personalized price o¤er to each consumer. There are a number of
reasons for doing this:
 Firstly, from a conceptual point of view, we feel that our model is closer in
spirit to pureprice competition, as quantities are not explicitly set, and no
consumer faces the risk of being rationed after accepting a price o¤er.
 Second, from the game-theoretic point of view, Dixons model is subsumed
in ours. If we restrict attention to price schedules that take only two values,
a su¢ ciently high one, at which no one buys, and an interior price, then
5See Allen and Hellwig (1986) as well.
6He assumes equal sharing, though he also assumes that all rms have the same cost function.
In fact, it is straightforward to see from the proofs of his Lemmas 1 and 2 that with asymmetric
costs and equal sharing, his model generically has no equilibrium. To regain existence the sharing
rule must be in proportion of competitive supply, see below.
7Dixon makes the shrewd but hardly realistic assumption that individual demand is pro-
portional to income. This ensures that residual demand is independent of the choice of rationing
rule. Nonetheless, some rationing rule is still necessary for the operation of the market.
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such price schedules are equivalent to a single price and a maximum quantity.8
Thus, Proposition 1 below shows that the larger strategy set does not lead to
a di¤erent equilibrium price (and neither does it destroy the existence of a
deterministic equilibrium price), while it also implies Dixons result.
 Third, in some applications like certain services, intermediate goods markets,
or Internet commerce, where via cookies sellers can price discriminate the
option of setting personalized prices is more realistic than posted prices. In
fact, as we will see, we need not assume that the price schedule be measurable
at the individual level. For example, rms with many, geographically distrib-
uted, outlets potentially charging di¤erent prices would also t our model,
barring integer problems. We can also think of the personalized o¤ers as
proxies for personally negotiated deals, even in labor markets.
 Fourth, our model leads to a decentralized implementation, where each con-
sumer decides individually which price to accept in equilibrium, so there is no
need to appeal to demand sharing rules and to an invisible handclearing
the market.
 Finally, in the absence of capacity constraints (self-imposed or otherwise) our
equilibrium is not hostage to an exogenous choice of rationing rule.
In the remainder of this Introduction we give a brief overview of the most relevant
literature. We then present our model in detail in Section 2. Section 3 derives
the short-run equilibrium, while Section 4 looks at the long-run consequences. We
conclude with a brief discussion of our results.
1.2 A brief literature review
The traditional approach toward the resolution of the Bertrand Paradox pioneered
by Edgeworth (1897) has been to allow rms to choose the quantity they are willing
8Except that the quantity has the names of a subset of consumers on it, which only enriches
the set of possible outcomes.
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to sell at the price they set. In its pure form, this leads to an Edgeworth Cycle,
or, in modern parlance, a mixed strategy equilibrium (c.f. Levitan and Shubik,
1972): Even if the equilibrium is unique, the range of prices o¤ered is large9 and
the two rms generically set di¤erent prices. Allowing rms to set supply functions
(complete quantity-price schedules) does not eliminate severe multiplicity either (c.f.
Klemperer and Meyer, 1989).10
Building on the insights gained from the analysis of Bertrand competition with
capacity constraints by Levitan and Shubik (1972), Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)
constructed a two-stage model where rms rst commit to capacity levels (or simply
produce prior to the realization of demand) and then price competition follows. The
remarkable outcome is that in the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium prices and
quantities (produced and sold) are the same as those that would result in a one-shot
Cournot competition. Unfortunately, Davidson and Deneckere (1986) showed that
this result is not robust to the choice of rationing rule: Kreps and Scheinkman used
the e¢ cient or surplus-maximizing rule, where the demand is served starting
from the highest valuation buyer. As this rule results in the most pessimistic residual
demand curve for a rm with the higher price, for any other rule the outcome is
more competitive than the Cournot equilibrium.
Looking at competition from the long-run perspective is indeed insightful and
it is the main contribution of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). However, selecting
the xed factor to be a choice of capacity is not only unnecessarily restrictive
but it is also somewhat misleading. The latter weakness comes from the undue
prominence capacity choice gives to rationing. Allowing for the short-run cost curve
to be smooth, avoids rationing altogether as the rms are able to supply within
reasonable limits, see below the entire demand, even if they wished not to. Cabon-
Dhersin and Drouhin (2014) were the rst to look at a two-stage model with soft
9For example, when demand is Q = 1   p and cost is quantity squared, with the proportional
rationing rule proposed by Edgeworth, prices would oscillate between 1/2 (the competitive price)
and 2/3.
10Note that we assume deterministic (aggregate) demand, where indeed Klemperer and Meyer
nd multiplicity.
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capacity constraints.11 In the rst period the rms choose at a cost a Cobb-
Douglas production function for the second stage. They use Dastidars (1995) model
of price competition in the second stage, which they rene by selecting the collusive
(payo¤-dominant) equilibrium.
2 Personalized pricing
Specically, we assume that there is a set 
 of N producers, indexed by J =
1; 2; :::; N , with increasing, strictly convex, twice di¤erentiable costs functions, CJ(q),
withCJ(0) = 0, and there is a unit mass of consumers, indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. Consumer
i has valuation vi 2 [0; 1] for a single unit. vi is an i.i.d. draw from the strictly
increasing and continuous cumulative distribution function F (v).12 Note that ag-
gregation results in a deterministic aggregate demand function D(p)  1   F (p) :
[0; 1] ! [0; 1]. We assume that rms do not observe individual buyer valuations
(however, see Remark 5 below). Outside options are normalized to zero.
We denote the inverse of rm Js marginal cost function its price-taking supply
function by SJ(p), and dene the competitive price, p, as the price that equates
aggregate supply and demand : D(p) =
PN
J=1 SJ (p
). Our innovation to the
extensive form is to allow rms to simultaneously make personalized price o¤ers to
each of the consumers. Next, consumers observe their o¤ers and accept at most one
of them. Formally:
Let PJ(:) : [0; 1]! [0; 1] ; be rm Js price schedule and let P = (P1; P2; :::; PN)
denote the prole of the sellersstrategies. Also, let i denote consumer is (mixed)
strategy, where i = (1i ; 
2
i ; :::; 
N
i ) and 
J
i : RN+ ! [0; 1] ; with
P
J2
 
J
i  1;
represents consumer is probability of accepting the o¤er received from rm J : PJ(i).
11Boccard and Wauthy (2000/2004) look at an extension of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) where
the capacity can be voluntarily exceeded, at a linear cost. Previously, Vives (1986) proposed the
same model of exible technology, in a two-stage model where the second stage is assumed to be
competitive.
12The generalization is straightforward to the case where there are several di¤erent groups of
consumers, whose valuations are drawn from a group-specic distribution.
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We say that the outcome of (P; ) is measurable if for each J , Ji (P (i)) is (Lebesgue)
measurable in i.13
Note that the individual consumers are full-edged players in the game and it is
their endogenously derived equilibrium strategies that determine how demand
is shared among rms asking for the same (lowest) price. At the same time, rms
are committed to satisfy the (unit) demand of all the consumers who accept their
o¤er, thereby eliminating the need for a rationing rule (see Remark 2 below).
2.1 The short-run equilibrium
The main result of this section is that assuming that it is not prohibitively costly14
for anyN 1 rms to serve the market demand at p our decentralized price setting
mechanism leads to the competitive outcome.
We prove the following result in the Appendix:15
Proposition 1 For all J , as long as CI

SI(p
)D(p)
D(p) SJ (p)

< 1 for all I 6= J , the
unique measurable equilibrium outcome in pure price schedules is such that all trades
are at the competitive price and rms sell in proportion to their competitive supply:
rm Js o¤er of p is accepted by a measure SJ(p) of consumers.
While the equilibrium outcome is unique, there are multiple ways of implement-
ing it. The leading contender is the (unique) equilibrium, where both rms and
consumers use symmetric strategies: all rms post the competitive price, PJ(:)  p,
and the consumers who are willing to buy, vi  p, use a mixed strategy of accep-
13Equivalently, if
Z 1
0
Ji (P)di exists for all J .
14See Remark 3.
15When a continuum of agents each randomize over a common nite set of actions, there is no
guarantee that the set of agents that choose certain action (in this case, accepting trading with
seller J) is measurable. In that case, payo¤s and best responses cannot be dened. In order to
avoid what is but a technical issue, we will only consider strategy proles where this indeterminacy
does not arise. The concept of equilibriumimplicitly requires measurability of outcomes, anyway.
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tance, where Firm Js o¤er is accepted with probability SJ(p)=D(p) that equals
its share of the aggregate competitive supply of the rms making the lowest o¤er.
If there are several rms that are not too unequal, there exists another focal
equilibrium strategy prole which minimizes the number of (serious) o¤ers made
where the rms coordinate so that each consumer receive exactly two o¤ers of
p (and thus they make twice as many o¤ers as they wish to sell: 2SJ(p)), who
then accept with 50-50 chance. Note that, despite the di¤erent mixed acceptance
strategy, demand is still shared in proportion of the competitive supplies. This
observation highlights that it is the rmsand consumersstrategies together that
determine how demand is shared.
Before developing the intuition for this result, some important observations are
in order:
Remark 1 We have seen that in order to achieve endogenous rationing in equi-
librium, we need either the consumers to be able to calculate the rmscompetitive
supplies, or the rms to coordinate on which consumers to target. While, game-
theoretically speaking, both of these characteristics are ne, they need some justi-
cation from the viewpoint of realism. The rst possibility could be rationalized, for
example, by rms advertising in proportion to their size/competitive supply. Coordi-
nation between rms can be a real-life situation, for example, where the unit-demand
consumers are actually aggregated into retailers and the rms can observe which re-
tailer their competitors intend to sell to. In any case, we wish to underscore that
this is a conceptual exercise: our goal is to understand price competition in the most
abstract setting.
Remark 2 The symmetric equilibrium strategies involve commitment to o¤er the
good16 for the competitive price to all consumers (who  if vi  p  then use
a mixed strategy of acceptance in proportion to the rms competitive supply).17
16This may consist of a substitute good or a rain check. The crucial assumption is that a
consumer who has accepted an o¤er no longer has unsatised demand in the market.
17This many o¤ers are not needed in general. The necessary condition is that all buyers receive
at least two o¤ers.
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Thanks to the Law of Large Numbers eliminating uncertainty, the highest realized
demand for rm I following a unilateral deviation by rm J is SI(p
)D(p)
D(p) SJ (p) , which
by assumption is still feasible to satisfy. Following a deviation by a competitor, a
rm would prefer to ration consumers. There must be either su¢ cient reputational
concerns or enforced consumer protection regulation in place to ensure compliance.
Remark 3 For clarity, we have set the limit of feasibility at innite total cost.
One can replace innity by any other number that determines the limit of feasibility
for satisfying residual demand, depending on the circumstances (for example, the
bankruptcy constraint in Dixon, 1992). Note that the more rms there are, the
lower is the residual demand following a unilateral deviation and the easier is to
satisfy the feasibility constraint. If the constraint is not satised, it is not possible
to avoid rationing.
Remark 4 Unlike in standard Bertrand competition, the strategies sustaining the
equilibrium are not weakly dominated: making o¤ers to fewer consumers would de-
crease prots. Nonetheless, it is true that, due to the commitment to serve all
accepted o¤ers, a deviating competitor could provoke a serious loss in prots. Thus,
a rm might worry about a kind of strategic risk, in the spirit of risk dominance,
even if our equilibrium is unique. However, it is easy to see that, if we actually incor-
porate such a risk into the analysis, there is no qualitative change in the equilibrium
and the  unique and common  price moves continuously with the probability of
mistakes. For example, if each o¤er got lost with probability ", the new equilibrium
price for a symmetric duopoly would become the solution of p = C 0((1  "2)D(p)=2).
Alternatively, if all the o¤ers of a competitor could be lost with probability , the
new price would solve p(1 + ) = 2C 0(D(p)) + (1  )C 0(D(p)=2).
Remark 5 Note that, if we assume that consumer valuations are observable, our
mechanism allows rms to perfectly price discriminate. Proposition 1 would still
apply: marginal cost pricing continues to be the equilibrium outcome, so competition
drives out price discrimination. Unlike in the case of monopoly, the lack/presence
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of the ability to price discriminate has no e¢ ciency consequences.18
In the unique equilibrium outcome all consumers willing to trade do so at the
competitive price, and all rms end up with the same marginal cost, equalling it. As
a result, rms do not want to undo any sales and, while lowering some price o¤ers
would lead to further sales, this would lead to a loss, as marginal cost would exceed
this price. This is rather straightforward, and in fact it also holds in the posted
price setting: the competitive price is contained in Dastidars interval.19 What is
more intricate is to see that all equilibria must satisfy the condition that (common)
price equals (common) marginal cost. Let us break this claim down into two pieces.
Assume rst, that we have established that in equilibrium all rms have the same
marginal cost (as implied by Dastidars symmetry assumptions). In that case, each
inframarginal consumer is equally valuable to each rm, so they all must buy at
the same price. Can this price be below marginal cost? No, because then some (in
fact, each) rm would prefer to decrease its sales, by raising its price to a subset
of consumers. Can the common price be above marginal cost? No, because then
some (in fact, each) rm would prefer to increase its sales, by lowering its price to a
18This is in contrast to Armstrong and Vickers (1993) but in line with Holmes (1989) and Stole
(2007).
19The exact description of Dastidars interval (especially its lower bound) depends on whether
there are xed costs of production (for simplicity we assume not: CJ(0) = 0) and on the rule
according to which rms charging the same (lowest) price split demand. For consistency with our
endogenously derived equilibrium sharing, we adopt the assumption made by Vives (1999) see
Dastidar (1997) as well that the split is in proportion to their price taking supply (SJ(p)): rm
Js share as a proportion of the aggregate output if rms in    
 set the lowest price (p) is
J(p;  ) =
SJ (p)P
I2  SI(p)
. With this assumption, the Dastidar interval is straightforward to describe
(see Vivesnote 7 in Chapter 5), as by construction  in equilibrium all rms must produce:
The lowest Dastidar equilibrium price is the lowest commonly charged price where all rms make
non-negative prots. As at the competitive price they all have the same marginal cost (p) which
is above average cost (as CJ(0) = 0 and C 00J > 0), p < p
. The highest Dastidar price is the
highest commonly charged price at which no rm would prefer to serve all the demand. As at
the competitive price they all charge at marginal cost, any additional amount sold would strictly
decrease their prots, implying that they would strictly prefer not to serve all the demand. Thus,
by the continuity of payo¤s, p < p.
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subset of consumers. Note that the same arguments fail with posted prices, as then
a rms deviation choices are to undercut all rms for all consumers or to lose out
to everyone and sell nothing.
Finally, let us argue why all rms should have the same marginal cost in equi-
librium. Assume otherwise: then a lower-marginal-cost (lmc) rm could undercut
a higher-marginal-cost (hmc) rm for a subset of its consumers with a price which
is higher than lmcs marginal cost and increase its prot as the hmc rm would
not make any o¤er below its marginal cost and it must make a positive measure of
sales in equilibrium.
3 The long run
Now that we have a unique prediction for the outcome of Bertrand competition
in the short run, we can turn to the question of the choice of or investment in
productive technology, which was considered to be xed in the short run. For
simplicity, we will keep the number of rms constant even in the long run.
We assume that all rms have access to the same technology and input prices, and
so the same di¤erentiable, sub-additive production function f(K;L) which satises
fK , fL > 0, fLL, fKK < 0, and fKL > 0. Here K, say capital, priced at r, is
considered to be the xed factor while L, say labor, priced at w, is the short-run
decision variable.20 When K is xed, the production function results in a cost
function CSR = wL(q;K), where L(q;K) is the short-run input demand for L
implicitly dened by
f(K;L(q;K))  q: (1)
20Brander and Spencer (1983) were the rst to discuss Cournot competition following R&D
investment, which, from the production and cost functions points of view is equivalent to our
model. They also allowed for exibleproduction functions. As Cournot and Bertrand embody
opposite incentives to use the strategic variable (R&D or capital) our results in this respect will
mirror theirs. Needless to say, this is not the focus of this paper: rather, we are investigating the
sources of ine¢ ciencies when pricing is e¢ cient, and also to what extent is Cournot a good reduced
form of this pricing model.
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Di¤erentiating both sides with respect to q we obtain fLL0(q;K)  1, implying
that MCSR(q;K) = wL0(q;K) = w
fL
. Di¤erentiating this with respect to q; we have
that marginal cost is increasing and thus it can be inverted to yield the short-run
supply function, S(p;K) = f 1L (w=p;K), assumed in the previous section:
@MCSR(q;K)
@q
=  fLL  w
f 3L
> 0:
Di¤erentiating the short-run marginal cost with respect to K, we have that at
any given quantity, marginal cost is reduced by investment:
@MCSR(q;K)
@K
=  fKL  w
f 2L
< 0: (2)
Thus, rms indeed have an incentive to sink capital into their technology.
We model the long-run competition as follows: In the rst stage, rms simulta-
neously install their xedinputs, KJ ; J = 1; 2; :::; N ; these are publicly observed
before the second stage, where they engage in simultaneous personalized price set-
ting. By our result in the previous section and sequential rationality it is common
knowledge that the second stage leads to a unique equilibrium outcome, price p and
quantity S(p), parametrized by the capital structure,K, installed in the rst stage.
Thus, given the capital choices of all other rms, K J , rm Js best response in
the rst stage solves
max
KJ

p(K)SJ(p(K);KJ)  CSR(SJ(p(K);KJ);KJ)  rKJ
	
: (3)
The rst-order condition for this maximization problem is
@p
@KJ
SJ +
 
p  MCSR dSJ
dKJ
= r +
@CSR
@KJ
; (4)
where we have omitted the arguments of the functions for compactness. As we have
discussed in the previous section, p = MCSR, so the above condition simplies to
@p
@KJ
SJ = r +
@CSR
@KJ
: (5)
This leads to the following immediate result.
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Proposition 2 In equilibrium all rms underinvest, not only relative to the rst
best but even conditional on their equilibrium output.
Proof. Note that in equilibrium the right-hand side of (5) has the same sign as
@p
@KJ
. We will show that @p

@KJ
< 0, implying that in equilibrium 0 > r + @C
SR
@KJ
. In
other words, an extra unit of capital would decrease short-term costs by more than
its price. That is, K is below the cost-minimizing level for the equilibrium output
level, just as claimed in the proposition.
Recall that in short-run equilibrium
X
I 6=J
S(p;KI) = D(p)  S(p;KJ). Totally
di¤erentiating both sides with respect to KJ we obtainX
I 6=J
S 0(p;KI)  dp

dKJ
= D0(p)
dp
dKJ
  S 0(p;KJ) dp

dKJ
  @S(p
;KJ)
@KJ
: (6)
Solving for dp

dKJ
we have
dp
dKJ
=
@S(p;KJ )
@KJ
D0(p) 
X
I2

S 0(p;KI)
: (7)
By (2), @S(p
;KJ )
@KJ
> 0. Moreover, we have established already that marginal costs are
increasing and thus S 0(p;KJ) > 0 for all rms. The fact that demand is downward
sloping completes the proof.
Note that Proposition 2 points to an e¤ect beyond the hold-up problem: It is
not that rms restrict investment because they will not reap its full benet. Rather,
there is a market power e¤ect: taking into account that the nal price decreases in
their investment, the rms have an additional reason to invest too little in capital.
This is an example of the puppy dog ploy in Tiroles (1988) terminology. The
following result provides further insight.
Corollary 1 If rm I deviates in the rst stage and increases its capital investment,
the rest of the rms will all reduce production: dS(p
;KJ )
dKI
< 0; for J 6= I:
Proof. By the proof of Proposition 2, dp

dKJ
< 0: As S 0(p;KJ) > 0; the result follows.
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That is, upon unilateral investment, the resulting decrease in price of course in-
creases demand but it decreases the output of the competing rms, thereby limiting
the price drop. We will build on this insight in the following section.
It is worth noting that the proposition implies that the short-run marginal cost
is strictly larger than the long-run marginal cost for the equilibrium level of output.
That is, even though the price equals the short-run marginal cost, the equilibrium
is not e¢ cient: the price is higher than the long-run marginal cost (market power
e¤ect) and rms do not minimize costs (cost ine¢ ciency). This cost ine¢ ciency
consequence of oligopoly is ignored when K is thought of as capacity, notably as
in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Davidson and Deneckere (1986). Interpreting
K as capacity, is a particular case of our model, assuming that f(K;L) is a Leontie¤
production function, except for the lack of di¤erentiability.
3.1 Cournot or not, revisited
We can now check what our two-stage model has to say in the discussion of whether
the (long-run) Cournot model is a good proxy for a two-stage market, where rms
rst take decisions that a¤ect the cost of output, and which they take as given when
they set their prices.
Using (7), we rst show that, given K J , the function qJ(K) = S(p(K);KJ) is
increasing in KJ :
@qJ
@KJ
= S 0J
dp
dKJ
+
@SJ
@KJ
=
@SJ
@KJ
0BB@ S 0(p;KJ)
D0(p) 
X
I2

S 0(p;KI)
+ 1
1CCA > 0:
Thus, we can invert qJ(KJ ;K J) and dene K2s(q;K J) as the level of K that a
rm would choose in the rst stage if in the second stage equilibrium it sold q, given
its rivalscapital choice, K J . Therefore, the rst-stage best response problem, (3),
can be rewritten as a choice of qJ instead of KJ :
max
qJ

p(K J ; K2sJ )qJ   CSR
 
qJ ;K
2s
J
  rK2sJ 	
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The rst-order condition for this problem is
dp
dqJ
q2sJ + p
  MCSR  q2sJ ;K2sJ   @CSR (q2sJ ;K2sJ )@KJ + r

dK2sJ
dqJ
= 0: (8)
Let us turn to the best response in the one-shot Cournot model:
max
qJ

PCqJ   rKCJ   CSR
 
qJ ;K
C
J
	
:
The rst-order condition for this problem is
 
PC
0
qCJ + P
C  MCSR  qCJ ;KCJ  
 
@CSR
 
qCJ ;K
C
J

@KJ
+ r
!
dKCJ
dqJ
= 0;
but observing that the last term on the left-hand side must be zero (investment
must be e¢ cient conditional on output) we have
 
PC
0
qCJ + P
C  MCSR  qCJ ;KCJ  = 0: (9)
As, by Proposition 2, the last term on the left-hand side in (8) is positive, (8) and
(9) together imply that
dp
dqJ
q2sJ + p
  MCSR  q2sJ ;K2sJ  <  PC0 qCJ + PC  MCSR  qCJ ;KCJ  : (10)
Assume that it were the case that q2sJ  qCJ : In that case we would necessarily have
that p  PC : Also, observe that dp
dqJ
here refers to the change in the equilibrium
price of our two-stage model that would result from an increase in KJ so that,
also in equilibrium, rm J sells one more unit of output, while P 0 is the change
in the market clearing price if starting from the Cournot equilibrium aggregate
production is increased by one unit. Note that, evaluated at the same output levels,
say q2sJ ;
 dpdqJ  < jP 0j, since by Corollary 1 in our two stage model the increase in
KJ would result in a reduction of all other rmsoutputs. Therefore, we would
also have that dp

dqJ
q2sJ > P
0(q2sJ )q
2s
J . Consequently, if the demand function is not too
concave dp

dqJ
q2sJ 
 
PC
0
qCJ . Putting these inequalities together with (10) we obtain
MCSR (q2sJ ;K
2s
J ) > MC
SR
 
qCJ ;K
C
J

. As we have assumed q2sJ  qCJ , this can only
hold if K2sJ < K
C
J , which, by Corollary 1, cannot be. Thus we have proved the
following.
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Proposition 3 When the demand function is not too concave,21 equilibrium output
is higher (equilibrium price is lower) in the two-stage model with price competition
than in the one-stage quantity competition model.
Proposition 3 implies that the Cournot outcome is an overestimation of the mar-
ket power that oligopolistic rms enjoy (thereby giving a non-cooperative foundation
for Vives (1986), who assumes price taking behavior in the second stage). This is
consistent with Davidson and Deneckeres (1986) critique of Kreps and Scheinkmans
(1983) rendering of rst long-run quantity, and then short-run price competition.
However, our result is not based on the plausibility of one or another rationing rule,
but rather on a basic, but quite di¤erent, strategic interaction taking into account
input substitutability.
In fact, if we assumed Leontie¤ technologies, then our model would result in the
same equilibrium output as in the Cournot model! That is, under their common
technological assumptions, Kreps and Scheinkman, not Davidson and Deneckere,
would be right. Indeed, if the production function were Leontie¤, then in equi-
librium rms would always mix inputs e¢ ciently in our model. The marginal cost
when the xed input is used strictly below the e¢ cient level is innity, and so the
demand would never cross total supply at such price. Also, and for the same reason, dpdqJ  = jP 0j in that case. Indeed (and as long as the price is above the constant
marginal cost below capacity), increasing capacity by a unit will increase aggregate
output in exactly one unit. The rest of the rms would still produce up to capac-
ity in our model. Thus, with Leontie¤ technology our two-stage model would also
predict, as the only symmetric equilibrium, the Cournot outcome.
21Note that convexity of the demand simply means that the density of consumers is decreasing in
their valuation: there are more poor people than rich. Alternatively, for an unconstrained demand
function, but either a homothetic production function (proof available on request), or for the Vives
(1986) technology zero short-run marginal cost up to capacity, constant marginal cost thereafter
Proposition 3 also holds.
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3.2 Discussion
Price competition should lead to marginal cost pricing even when rms enjoy market
power. As price competition is perhaps the best description of market behavior in
the short run, we should expect that the price is indeed close to the marginal cost
of rms. However, we have been familiar with the distinction between long and
short run since the days of our rst college studies of Microeconomics. Certain
decisions, input decisions in particular, are mostly taken as given, when prices are
chosen, as Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) argued. Fixed production factors typically
result in decreasing returns even when the technology is constant returns in the long
run. Thus, marginal cost pricing and extraordinary prots are compatible. What is
important to understand is not so much the di¤erence between price and (short-run)
marginal cost, but the incentives for the choice of levels and mix of inputs and as
a result, the level of output arising from the strategic considerations present when
rms do have market power: when rmsdecisions a¤ect market output and price.
This is the main message of this paper. We have shown how these strategic
considerations typically lead to both an ine¢ cient mix of inputs, with long-run
decisions resulting in too low levels of these long-run determined inputs; and result
in prices above long-run marginal cost.
We have also shown that, from a long-run point of view, and as argued by
Davidson and Deneckere (1986), (short-run) price competition results in more output
than predicted by the Cournot model. According to our analysis, the discrepancy
comes from the strategic interaction between the long-run decisions of the di¤erent
rms. When a rm determines its own short-run cost function by investing in the
long-run factor of production, it takes into account how these decisions will a¤ect
future output decisions of rivals. A lower short-run marginal cost will be answered by
rivals with a reduction in their own output. Thus, investments in these production
factors have a lower impact on prices than what is predicted by the Cournot model.
The result is a stronger incentive on short-run cost reduction and therefore, a larger
output.
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Despite this stronger incentive to invest in the long-run factor, the equilibrium
input mix shows ine¢ ciently low levels of it. As we have shown, this is associated
with the e¤ect of the long-run factor on prices, and is a well-understood phenomenon
in price competition: at the cost minimizing mix of inputs, a small reduction in the
use of the long-run input increases the equilibrium price. When marginal units are
sold at marginal (short-run) cost, this e¤ect dominates the second order e¤ect on
cost minimization.
Both the departure from the e¢ cient mix of inputs and the departure from long-
run marginal cost pricing are, therefore, consequences of market power. Indeed,
from (2) if symmetric rms behave symmetrically and there are N active rms in
the market,
 @p@KJ  < 1N 1 . Thus, as N gets large @p@KJ approaches zero and, by (5),
the input mix approaches e¢ ciency. Moreover, market clearing (and e¢ cient input
mix) implies output per rm approaching 0, at which point long-run marginal cost
equals short run marginal cost (and then price).22
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have presented a novel way of modelling price competition, which
leads to marginal cost pricing but positive prots as the unique equilibrium,
without the need to specify rationing (when demand exceeds supply) or sharing
22This is not an artifact of our assumption of always increasing average cost, and so marginal
cost of 0 at q = 0. Indeed, assume the more standard, "U-shaped" average cost in the long run,
and dene the minimum e¢ cient scale
q = arg min
q
fC(q)
q
g:
Let p = C(q
)
q , i.e., the average cost at that level of output. If
N =
D(p)
q
is large, as N approaches N, market clearing and e¢ cient input mix implies output per rm
approaching q, at which point, again, long run marginal cost equals short term marginal cost and
so price.
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(when supply exceeds demand) rules. It should therefore be a useful o¤-the-shelf
workhorse model to embed in more complex scenarios.
We have also developed the most direct implications in a set-up with long-run
competition, underlining the consequences of market power as ine¢ cient investments
in the xed factor. This analysis has also shed more light on the literature on two-
stage, Bertrand-Edgeworth competition.
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5 Appendix
Proof. (of Proposition 1) First, we show that charging p to (almost) everyone is
indeed an equilibrium. Suppose that consumers use a mixed strategy of acceptance
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such that if they receive the lowest o¤er, p, from the rms in    
, they proba-
bilistically accept them in proportion of the rmscompetitive supplies at p: they
accept rm Js o¤er with probability J(p;  ) =
SJ (p)P
I2  SI(p)
.
Assume all rms but J make a price o¤er p to all consumers, and consider
the best response of rm J : PJ(:): Let Q1 be the (Lebesgue) measure of the set
fi : PJ(i) < pg and Q2 be the measure of the set fi : PJ(i) = pg. Then, the prots
of rm J are not larger than p(Q1 +J(p; 
)Q2) CJ (Q1 + J(p; 
)Q2). Indeed,
a mass of consumers Q1 accept Js o¤er of a price below p, and a mass of consumers
Q2 receive N o¤ers of p, and proportion23 J(p; 
) of these accept rm Js o¤er.
The rest of consumers receive better o¤ers than rm Js o¤er to them so since,
by assumption, the other rms can satisfy all the demand at p they do not buy
from it. Now, note that Q = J(p; 
)D(p) = SJ(p) solves
max
Q
pQ  CJ(Q);
and therefore, p(Q1+J(p; 
)Q2) CJ (Q1 + J(p; 
)Q2)  pSJ(p) CJ (SJ(p)).
Observing that by using the price schedule PJ(i)  p, rm J sells exactly SJ(p),
we can see that PJ(i)  p is indeed a best response. Finally, as the consumers are
indi¤erent, they are clearly happy mixing in the prescribed proportions. Note that
the Ji thus dened is indeed measurable.
We now show that there exists no other measurable equilibrium outcome with
pure strategy price schedules. Assume the Law of Large Numbers is satised for
a continuum  in the index i of independent random variables  on 
 with
bounded variance, so that the quantity that rm J sells in a hypothetical alternative
equilibrium is qJ(P;) =
R
Ji (P(i))di almost surely.
Note that forP to be part of an equilibrium it has to be that PJ(i)  C 0J(qJ(P;))
for almost all i such that Ji (P(i)) > 0. Indeed, otherwise rm J could prot by
increasing her o¤er (up to, say, PJ(i) = 1) to a positive measure of these consumers
so as not to sell to them.
Next, note that each rm must sell a positive amount in equilibrium. Indeed,
23By the Law of Large Numbers this proportion is deterministic.
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consider a small  > 0. Since the marginal cost is increasing, there could be no more
than (N 1) consumers that receive a price o¤er belowminJ 0 6=J C 0J 0() > C 0J(0) = 0:
otherwise, some producer J 0 would be selling units below marginal cost and so
would prot from withdrawing the corresponding o¤ers. Thus, there are at least
D(minJ 0 6=J C 0J 0())   (N   1) (> 0; for  small enough) that are willing to pay
minJ 0 6=J C 0J 0() > C
0
J(0) and either dont buy or buy at higher prices from the other
rms. Thus, if qJ(P;) were 0, J could gain by o¤ering to a small measure of those
consumers the price minJ 0 6=J C 0J 0().
Next, observe that in equilibrium we must have C 0J(qJ(P;)) = C
0
I(qI(P;))
for all J , I. Otherwise, if C 0J(qJ(P;)) > C
0
I(qI(P;)) then rm I could prot by
deviating and making a (unique winning) o¤er PJ(i)    to some arbitrarily small
but positive measure  of consumers i such that Ji (P(i)) > 0, for some  satisfying
(PJ(i)    ) C 0J(qJ(P;))   > C 0I(qI(P;) + ).24
Similarly, PJ(i) = C 0J(qJ(P;)) for all J , and for almost all i such that 
J
i (P(i)) >
0. Indeed, if PJ(i) > C 0J(qJ(P;)) = C
0
I(qI(P;)) for a positive measure of i such
that Ji (P(i)) > 0, then rm I could prot by reducing her price to PJ(i)  , to a
small but positive measure of these consumers and for a small enough . That would
increase the sales of rm I by a positive measure, at a price above its marginal cost.
It follows that in any equilibrium almost all consumers must buy at the same price
in equilibrium. We have left to show that this price must be the competitive price.
That is, we need to show that the total sales must be equal to the demand at the
price common to all transactions. It cannot be higher, since then some consumers
would be buying at a price higher than their willingness to pay. It cannot be smaller
either. Indeed, in such a case a positive measure of consumers with willingness to
pay higher than p = C 0J(qJ(P;)) would not buy. Some rm could prot by devi-
ating and o¤ering to a small measure of them a price equal to their willingness to
pay (and above its marginal cost).
24If for some of these i, Ii (P(i)) > 0 as well, then the condition is even easier to satisfy.
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